We consider project financing when the project quality is private information of the manager and, given its inherent quality, the project viability depends on the manager exerting unobservable effort. We show that capital structure matters even though managerial contracts are optimally designed. We also provide an explanation of why good firms issue both debt and underpriced equity (even if the bankruptcy and agency costs of debt are zero). Finally, we show that the optimal financial contract can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity. Our results have a number of testable implications.
Introduction
Following the famous irrelevance proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , a vast literature has developed trying to explain the financial choices of firms when they seek outside funds. This research effort has given rise to two main theories of capital structure: the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory. The trade-off theory argues that the firms determine their optimal capital structure by balancing the benefits and the costs of debt at the margin.
1 According to the pecking-order theory (Myers (1984) , Myers and Majluf (1984) ), because managers are better informed about the firm quality than outside financiers, if good firms issue risky securities to raise funds these securities will be underpriced. The extent of the mispricing depends on the informational sensitivity of the claim issued. Debt is the least information-sensitive security and so it minimizes the mispricing. That is, firms should issue debt first and then equity as a last resort. 2 However, these two theories of capital structure have difficulties in explaining some well-documented financing patterns. One of the main predictions of the trade-off model, the positive relation between leverage and profitability, is at odds with the empirical evidence. Several empirical studies have reported a negative relationship (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) ).
Concerning the pecking-order theory, equity issue announcements are associated with stock price drops (e.g. Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Jung et al. (1996) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) ), whereas debt issue announcements have no significant effect on the stock price (e.g. Jung et al. (1996) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) ). That is, debt is a more favourable signal than equity. Nevertheless, equity dominates debt as a source of external financing. Fama and French (2005) find that during the period 1983-2002 small firms (which probably face the most severe asymmetric information problems) raised more funds through equity issues than debt issues even though they appeared to have unexploited debt capacity.
3 Frank and Goyal (2003) report that net equity issues follow the financing deficit more closely than debt issues. Finally, in Jung et al (1996) , a significant fraction of typical debt-issuing firms (firms with low leverage and high tax payments) issue equity. These empirical findings contradict the predictions of the pecking order theory even after taking into account the various costs associated with debt issues. Fama and French (2005) also report that during the period 1973-2002 the number of highly profitable firms declines, and the number of unprofitable or low-profitability firms increases. At the same time, the proportion of funds raised through equity issues, as opposed to debt issues, increases.
On theoretical grounds, these theories of capital structure have been criticized because they take managerial objectives as given and ignore the effects of the interaction between managerial compensation and capital structure on the managers' choices. For example, Dybvig and Zender (1991) consider the model in Myers and Majluf (1984) and show that if managerial contracts are optimally chosen the capital structure becomes irrelevant.
In this paper, we construct a simple asymmetric information model that sheds some light on the above issues. We abstract from taxes, financial distress, bankruptcy and other agency costs. We consider firms (projects) that seek outside financing under adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. More specifically, these firms are run by managers who can improve their firm's profitability by exerting costly and unobservable effort. There are also two types of projects, good (G) and bad (B), which differ with respect to their inherent quality. The project's quality can be observed only the entrepreneur and the manager. Given identical effort levels, good projects generate higher profits than the bad ones (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance). Also, regardless of the project's type, if the manager exerts effort the net present value (NPV) of his project exceeds the cost of effort whereas if he shirks the project has negative NPV. That is, exerting effort is socially efficient regardless of the project's inherent quality.
As a benchmark, we first consider the case where moral hazard is not binding (pure adverse selection). In this case, the role of securities is to convey socially costless information about the type of the project. Equity issued by the G-type is more valuable whereas debt issued by both types is equally valuable. 4 So, if the G-type issues some equity the B-type will mimic him and so in the resulting pooling equilibrium the G-type will subsidize the B-type through the mispricing of equity. However, in any pooling equilibrium where some mispriced equity is issued, the G-type has an incentive to deviate by issuing more debt (the relatively less valuable for him security). By doing so, he can credibly signal his type, reduce the mispricing and increase his expected return. As a result, no pooling equilibrium where some equity is issued can sustain. That is, the Gtype issues just debt to avoid selling an underpriced security (equity). Therefore, only the B-type may use equity to raise funds and so the market reacts negatively to the announcement of an equity issue. This prediction is consistent with the pecking order theory.
The introduction of moral hazard into an adverse selection framework has significant effects both on the combinations of the securities issued in equilibrium and their pricing. The distinguishing feature of this paper is the existence of pooling equilibria involving cross-subsidization across types and the issue of both debt and equity. These pooling equilibria reflect a trade-off between information revelation and effort incentives. The securities issued by both types of firms are priced as a pool. Although, because of perfect competition, debt and equity are fairly priced collectively, at individual level equity is mispriced. In fact, it is precisely this mispricing that provides the manager of a bad firm with the subsidy necessary to induce him to choose the socially efficient high-effort level.
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As we have seen, under pure adverse selection, good firms would have issued just debt to eliminate this mispricing. However, in the presence of moral hazard, the elimination of the subsidy destroys the bad firms managers' effort incentives. The managers of bad firms shirk and the aggregate expected return falls. As a result, the financiers, in order for 4 The market value of debt depends only on the success probability (which, given the effort level, is equal for both types of projects) whereas the value of equity depends on both the success probability and the return in case of success which greater for the good project. 5 If funds are offered at fair terms, the managers of good projects exert effort whereas those of bad projects shirk. Hence, the bad project's NPV is negative and so, if its type is revealed, no rational financier offers funds to it. Therefore, in order to receive financing, the manager of a bad project will always mimic the manager of a good one. them to break even, ask for a higher interest rate on debt. This additional cost of debt exceeds the underpricing of equity. That is, since they cannot reveal their type, good firms accept to issue just enough equity to induce the managers of bad firms to exert effort because the resulting increase in their net expected return (due to the lower interest rate on debt) more than offsets the cost of the subsidy (the adverse selection cost of issuing equity). Notice that as the proportion of bad firms increases, the fraction of equity needed to provide their managers with the subsidy necessary to induce them to work also increases (the debt-equity ratio falls).
Our results have several interesting implications. First, they show that capital structure matters even if managerial contracts are optimally chosen. Second, they provide an explanation of why good firms issue both debt and underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and other agency costs associated with debt are zero. The issue of equity, through its mispricing, provides the managers of bad firms with the incentives to work whereas debt is used to reduce the subsidy to the minimum required. What is more, because it relaxes the moral hazard constraint, the cross-subsidization occurring in this pooling equilibrium is socially beneficial. It results in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects leading to an improvement in the aggregate expected returns and social welfare.
They have also some implications for empirical testing: i) The higher the proportion of low-profitability (B-type) firms, the higher the fraction of funds raised through equity. This prediction is consistent with the findings in Fama and French (2005) .
6 ii) Because the good firms' equity is more valuable, once the firms' quality becomes known, good firms have lower debt-equity ratios. This negative relation between leverage and profitability has been documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) ).
Related Literature
This paper is related to three strands in the literature: agency models, pure adverse selection models and models combining adverse selection and moral hazard.
In the celebrated Jensen and Meckling (1976) paper firms issue both debt and equity to minimize the sum of agency costs of these two securities. 7 The agency cost of equity arises from the conflict of interest between management and outside shareholders. The agency cost of debt stems from the conflict of interest between existing shareholders (managers) and would-be debtholders. The issue of debt induces the managers to undertake riskier projects that reduce the value of debt and transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders (asset substitution problem). 8 6 Fama and French (2005) report that during the period 1973-2002 the proportion of high-profitability firms declines while the fraction of funds raised through equity increases. 7 More recently, Biais and Casamatta (1999) consider a model similar to Jensen and Meckling but they completely endogenize the contractual form. Nevertheless, they show that if the risk-shifting problem is more severe, a debt-equity combination (or convertible debt) can implement the optimal contract whereas if the effort problem is more severe stock options are also needed. 8 Notice that in our model there is no conflict of interests between shareholders and debtholders (no asset substitution problem) which, given the agency cost of equity, is the driving force of the coexistence of debt and equity in Jensen and Meckling. Jensen (1986) argues that managers have an incentive to invest to grow firms more than optimal (by undertaking even negative NPV projects) since this increases the resources under their control. Debt is a commitment to pay out cash (interest payments) whereas dividend payments are not compulsory. Thus, an increase in the amount of debt reduces the amount of free cash flow (cash flow in excess of that required to fund all positive NPV projects) available for managers to engage in value-reducing activities (empire building). Jung et al. (1996) use an argument along these lines to explain why some typical debt-issuing firms (firms with low leverage and high tax payments) issue equity although the announcement of a new equity issue leads to a fall in the stock price. The managers of these firms are willing to issue (even underpriced) equity to avoid the disciplinary effects of debt.
Pure adverse selection models emphasize the signalling role of the financing decisions of the firm.
9 For example, if firms have debt and equity outstanding and debt and equity repurchases are allowed, there potentially exist fully separating equilibria under a wide range of distributional assumptions. Brennan and Kraus (1987) allow only for debt repurchases and consider two cases: first-order stochastic dominance and meanpreserving spreads. They show that fully revealing equilibria can be obtained by issuing equity and repurchasing debt in the first case and by issuing convertible debt in the second. Constantinides and Grundy (1989) allow only equity repurchases and prove that, under first-order stochastic dominance, the issue of convertible debt coupled with equity repurchases leads to full information revelation. However, it should be noted that, in the absence of bankruptcy or financial distress costs, these pure adverse selection models cannot explain why good firms issue equity even if it is underpriced. This paper is most directly linked to models involving both adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. Darrough and Stoughton (1986) provide such a model where entrepreneurs are risk averse and can issue combinations of debt and equity. However, they only consider separating equilibria where the securities issued are fairly priced. As a result, neither cross-subsidization across types occurs nor the issue of equity when it implies adverse selection costs can be explained.
Notice that if the projects' inherent quality were observable, bad projects would not receive financing and so both investment and social welfare would be lower. These results contrast with those of pure adverse-selection models. In Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads firms to forego positive NPV projects whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it encourages firms to undertake negative NPV projects. Hence, in either case social welfare is lower than under full information about types. The key to this difference is that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard the cross-subsidization taking place in the pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional constraint and so it can be beneficial. In contrast, in these two pure adverse selection models there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects but it may have negative ones. This paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the basic framework and develops the analytical tools. Section 4 provides some general results about the existence and the type of the equilibria where funds are offered. Section 5 analyzes the roles of debt and equity under pure adverse selection and adverse selection cum moral hazard. In Section 6, we show that, in the adverse selection cum moral hazard case, a debt-equity combination can implement the optimal financial contract as a competitive equilibrium. Some brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
The Model
We consider a simple model of financing involving both adverse selection and effort moral hazard. There are four dates, 0, 1, 2 and 3, and one homogeneous (perishable) good which can be used either for consumption or investment purposes. There are also three groups of agents: entrepreneurs, managers and financiers. All agents are risk neutral and consume only at date 3.
Each entrepreneur has an indivisible project but no initial wealth. All projects require the same fixed initial investment I, at date 1. Since the entrepreneurs have no initial wealth, this amount I needs to be raised from the market. The projects are run by managers whose actions cannot be observed either by the entrepreneurs or the financiers. All managers have identical managerial skills and there are at least as many managers as projects. If a manager is not hired by an entrepreneur, his utility is zero.
Each financier has a very large amount of initial wealth and can lend at zero interest rate. For simplicity, we assume that there are just two financiers involved in Bertrand competition. Also, there are no taxes, no bankruptcy or financial distress costs.
At date 1, investment takes place and the managers decide whether they will exert effort or not. At date 2, the project quality becomes public information. Returns are realized at date 3 and are observable and verifiable. There are two states of nature: Success, Failure. If a project succeeds it yields i X . In case of failure, all projects yield 0 regardless of the project's type. There are two types of projects, G (good) and B (bad), with respective proportions in the population λ and λ
The success probability of a project, denoted by i j π , depends on the effort level that the manager chooses privately. There are two effort levels: Low (shirking), High (working). If a manager exerts effort, he incurs a utility cost of C and the project's success probability is i H π . If he shirks, his utility cost is 0 but the project's success probability is
Given identical effort levels, the success probability is the same for both types of projects but in case of success the good project's return is higher:
(Our results also hold true if
If the high effort level is chosen, the net present value (NPV) of both types of projects exceeds the cost of effort. In contrast, if shirking is chosen, neither project is economically viable (both types of projects have strictly negative NPV). That is,
). That is, the choice of the high effort level by the manager leads to an increase in the net social surplus regardless of the project's type and so is socially efficient.
Managerial Contracts
At date 0, the entrepreneur hires a manager to run his project. The managerial contract, ) , (
, specifies the manager's compensation, W , in each state of nature. The terms of the contract become public information. After the manager has signed his contract with the entrepreneur, he learns the type of the project. By Assumption 1, if the manager shirks the project has negative NPV. Thus, any rational financier will fund a project only if he knows that the managerial contract provides the manager with the incentive to exert effort. As a result, the managerial contract will be designed so as to induce the manager to work and its terms will become known to the financiers. The managerial contract will induce effort if:
The left-hand side of (1) is the increase in the manager's net expected return from exerting effort and the right-hand is the cost of effort. Given limited liability and the fact that the manager's outside option is zero, the entrepreneur will offer to the manager a contract that minimizes the wage bill given that it induces the manager to work. That is, the optimal managerial contract is:
Notice that, due to the unobservability of his actions, the manager extracts an
Financial Contracts
At date 1, the manager seeks the funds required for the investment, I. For expositional purposes (and without loss of generality), we restrict the financing instruments available to managers to debt and equity. Debt claims are zero-coupon bonds that are senior both to managerial compensation and equity.
A
provides the manager with the required amount of funds, I, in return for a combination of debt of face value D and a proportion of equity of
The manager chooses the contract that maximizes the entrepreneur's expected utility (return).
Therefore, given risk neutrality and limited liability, the manager seeks to maximize:
where i U is the expected utility of an entrepreneur of type i given that the contract ) , (
At date 1, when the financial contract is signed, the managers know the type of the project they run but the financiers cannot observe either the type of each project or verify the actions (choice of effort level) of the managers applying for funds. The financiers do, however, know the proportion of each type in the population of projects, the terms of the managerial contract and the nature of the investment and moral hazard technology. The financiers also wish to maximize their expected profit. The expected profit, 
Effort Incentive Constraints
Because debt is senior to managerial compensation, the structure of the financial contract will also affect the effort incentives of a manager running a project of type i faces. A given contract ) , ( D α will induce the high effort level if ), the face value of debt consistent with a manager running a bad project exerting effort is lower. That is, the set of effort incentive compatible contracts corresponding to G-type projects is strictly greater than that of the B-type (
Indifference Curves
The family of indifference curves of type i can be derived from Eq. (3). It should be noted that the shape of the indifference curves is independent of the probability of success. That is, the marginal rate of substitution of debt for equity of the G-type is greater than that of the B-type. Intuitively, equity is more valuable for the G-type whereas debt is equally valuable for both types.
12 As a result, the G-type is willing to accept a greater increase in D in exchange for a given reduction in α than the B-type. Technically, the single-crossing condition is satisfied. Also, the closer to the origin an indifference curve, the higher the expected utility.
Zero-profit Lines
The expected profit of a financier offering a contract
is given by Eq. (4). It is clear that the expected profit depends crucially on the effort level chosen (through the success probability of the project). Thus, if a zero-profit line crosses the corresponding effort incentive frontier ICF , it will exhibit a discontinuity because the success probability changes discontinuously when the entrepreneurs change their effort level. However, given limited liability and the assumption that both types of projects have negative NPV when the low effort level is chosen ( 0
financing a project whose manager is shirking is loss-making and no rational financier will offer it. Therefore, zero-profit lines can exist only if the high effort level is chosen (at least by the managers running one of the two types of projects).
More specifically, the zero-profit line corresponding to the i-type ( i ZP ) exists only if the i-type chooses the high effort level (his effort incentive constraint is satisfied) when he receives funds at fair terms. 13 In other words, the existence of a zero-profit line ( i ZP ) requires that it belong to the corresponding set of effort incentive compatible contracts ( i IC ). Given the investment and moral hazard technology, if both types receive funds at fair terms three different cases may arise: i) the effort incentive constraint is not binding for either type, ii) it is not binding for the G-type but is violated for the B-type, and iii) it is violated for both types. Conditional on the choice of the high effort level there exist three zero-profit lines: that corresponding to the G-type ( Proof: See the Appendix.
Intuitively, in Part (b), since both have the same success probability, given its face value, the debt issued by both types is equally valuable. Thus, if both issue only debt, zero profit for financiers requires the issue of the same level of debt. However, if equity is also issued, since the G-type equity is more valuable, a financier who just breaks even would ask for a lower proportion of equity if he offered funds to the G-type than to the B-type (given the face value of debt). That is, G ZP lies below B ZP at any strictly positive level of equity issued.
Also, since all three, zero-profit lines and indifference curves corresponding to type i have the same slope, they never cross. One of the indifference curves coincides with the corresponding zero-profit line. However, the location of the zero-profit line relative to the corresponding effort incentive frontier is the key determinant for the existence of the former.
Lemma 3. Suppose both types obtain funds at fair terms, then
Case (a) corresponds to pure adverse selection. Although, moral hazard is present, because for both types the NPV (
), it has no bite. If either type of project obtains funds at fair terms, its manager exerts effort and so the corresponding zero-profit line exists. In Case (b), financing at fair terms implies that the effort incentive constraints of managers running good projects are satisfied but those of managers running bad projects are violated ( G ZP belongs to Case (c), the NPV of the project falls short of the expected wage for both types. Thus, the managers of both types of projects opt for shirking and so no zero-profit line exists. Figure 1 provides an illustration for Case (b).
Equilibrium
It is well-known that, in most cases, the equilibrium outcome in competitive markets with asymmetric information depends crucially on the game-theoretic specification of the strategic interaction between the informed and uninformed agents. Yet, no agreement has been reached on which game structure is the most appropriate. Here, I assume that the financiers and the managers play the following three-stage screening game:
Stage 1: The two financiers simultaneously offer contracts ) , ( D α . Each financier may offer any finite number of contracts.
Stage 2: After observing the contracts offered by his rival, each financier decides which of the offers he made at Stage 1 will be withdrawn.
Stage 3: Given the contracts available after the withdrawals at Stage 2, the managers choose (at most) one contract from one financier. If a manager's most preferred contract is offered by both financiers, the manager chooses each financier's offer with probability 2 1 . In the light of the contract chosen, the manager decides whether to work or shirk.
This game structure rationalizes a Wilson equilibrium (1977) as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Unlike the two-stage screening game, it allows for the existence of a (interior) Nash pooling equilibrium when this pooling equilibrium Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium.
We only consider pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A pair of contracts ( • No contract in the equilibrium pair implies negative (expected) profits for the financier. In other words, the financiers' participation or IR constraints are satisfied:
• Profit maximization: No other set of contracts, if offered alongside the equilibrium pair at Stage 1, would increase a financier's expected profit.
Types of Equilibria and Provision of Funds: General Results
Because of Bertrand competition, any equilibrium involves zero expected profits for the financiers. This implies that any equilibrium contract must lie on one of the zero-profit lines. This, in turn, implies the following result: Proof: First, given limited liability, if funds are offered (whatever the terms they are offered at) all managers, regardless of the quality of the project they run, will always accept them and undertake their project. Thus, there cannot exist a separating equilibrium where only one type of project is undertaken. Suppose now there is a separating equilibrium in which the manager of a good project chooses contract ) , ( Lemma 4 implies that in cases where one (or both) of the zero-profit lines does not exist, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be pooling. Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium can exist only if
, then the resulting equilibria must be pooling. 15 We assume that if an entrepreneur is indifferent between hiring a manager and not he hires one. Given that assumption and limited liability, the entrepreneurs' participation constraints are always satisfied.
The next general result concerns the conditions under which funds are provided. ZP exists, no pooling zeroprofit line exists. If a financier offers funds to any firm, he will make losses. Therefore, no rational financier will do so (the financiers' participation constraints are violated). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. a) If
c I X H i H π π ≥ − , B G i , = ,
Types of Equilibria and Methods of Financing: Specific Results
Now that we have developed the analytical apparatus, we can go on to prove our main results. Subsection 5.1 examines the pure adverse selection case. In subsection 5.2 we consider the case where adverse selection and moral hazard interact.
The Pure Adverse Selection Case
It would be useful, as a benchmark, to first consider the pure adverse selection case (Case (a) of Lemma 3). In this case, as we have seen, no effort incentive constraint is binding if funds are offered at fair terms and so both zero-profit lines 
, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types issue only debt as well as a continuum of separating equilibria where the Gtype issues only debt whereas the B-type issues a combination of debt and equity. In any equilibrium, the securities issued are fairly priced (See Figure 2) .
Under pure adverse selection, debt and equity are only used to convey information about the type of the project. Because equity issued by a good firm is more valuable whereas debt issued by both types is equally valuable, if a good firm issues some equity the bad firm will mimic and so in the resulting pooling equilibrium the good firm will subsidize the bad one through the mispricing of equity. Hence, in any pooling equilibrium where some equity is issued, the manager of a good firm has an incentive to deviate by issuing more debt. By doing so, it can credibly signal his firm's type, reduce the crosssubsidization and increase the firm's shareholders (entrepreneur's) expected return. As a result, no pooling equilibrium where some equity is issued can sustain. That is, good firms issue just debt to avoid selling an underpriced security (equity). Given that, bad firms are indifferent between issuing just debt and any fairly priced combination of debt and equity. Therefore, the issue of equity signals a firm with a low quality project and so the market reacts negatively to its announcement. This prediction is consistent with the pecking order theory. 
The Adverse Selection cum Moral Hazard Case
In this subsection, we examine the case where the B-type NPV falls short of the expected wage (Case (b) of Lemma 3). That is, if the manager of a bad project is offered funds at fair terms, his effort incentive constraint is violated and so the corresponding zero-profit line does not exist. Thus, only pooling equilibria can exist. Because the choice of the high effort level is socially efficient, here we focus on pooling equilibria where both types exert effort. These equilibria involve cross-subsidization across types and Paretodominate any other equilibrium. Through the mispricing of equity at individual level, the B-type receives the subsidy necessary to induce him to work.
Proposition 4. Suppose that
exists a unique pooling equilibrium where the managers of both types of projects exert effort and obtain funds by issuing a combination of debt and equity (See Figure 3) . . The deviant contract, contract A′ , will attract only the G-type. This, in turn, implies that contract A is taken only by the B-type and so it becomes loss-making. As a result, at Stage 2, contract A will be withdrawn. Therefore, at Stage 3, the B-type will also choose A′ , and hence A′ becomes also loss-making (since to the right of The pooling equilibrium at A reflects a trade-off between information revelation and effort incentives. The securities issued by the G-and B-type are priced as a pool. Although, because of perfect competition, debt and equity are fairly priced collectively, at individual level equity issued by the G-type is underpriced and that issued by the Btype overpriced. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this mispricing that provides the managers of bad projects with the subsidy necessary to induce them to exert effort. At first sight, a financier has an incentive to deviate by offering a contract involving more debt and less equity than the equilibrium contract to profitably attract the G-type. However, his attempt will be fruitless. If the G-type chooses the deviant contract, the equilibrium contract becomes loss-making for the financiers and so it will be withdrawn at Stage 2. As a result, at Stage 3, the B-type will always mimic the G-type preventing him from revealing his type and obtaining funds in better terms. What is more, the deviant contract gives the B-type less subsidy and so destroys his effort incentives. The B-type shirks and the collective expected return falls significantly. A financier who offers a contract involving less equity than the equilibrium contract can break even only if he asks for a considerably greater face value of debt (higher interest rate on debt). But neither type prefers such a deviant contract to the equilibrium contract. Hence, no financier has an incentive to offer a contract involving less equity than the equilibrium contract and so the G-type stays in equilibrium and provides the B-type with just enough subsidy in order to induce him to work.
Loosely speaking, the G-type accepts to issue some equity and induce the B-type to exert effort because the increase in his net expected return (due to the lower interest rate
he pays on debt) more than offsets the cost of the incremental subsidy (the adverse selection cost of issuing equity). That is, the G-type is better off in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 where both debt and equity are issued and both types exert effort than in a pooling equilibrium where only debt is issued and so the B-type shirks (point M in Figure 3 ).
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Moreover, the role of debt and equity as communication devices implies that no financier can make a profit by offering a contract involving more equity (subsidy) and less debt than the equilibrium contract. Given the equilibrium contract, the deviant contract will be taken only by the B-type and so is loss-making.
That is, the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium relies on two factors: i) the endogenous (discrete) 18 choice of the effort level and ii) the three-stage game structure that allows for an (interior) pooling subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if cross-subsidization across types takes place and the single-crossing condition is met.
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If it exists, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 has several interesting implications: First, it shows that capital structure is relevant even though managerial contracts are optimally designed. Second, it provides an explanation of why good firms issue both debt and underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and other agency costs associated with debt are zero. Third, in contrast with the pure adverse selection case, the cross-subsidization is socially beneficial. It converts a negative into a positive NPV project and improves social welfare. Finally, it has implications for empirical testing.
Implications for the Issue of Securities
To fix ideas, let us compare the adverse selection cum moral hazard case with the pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard cases. Under pure adverse selection, the securities issued are only used to convey socially costless information about the type of the project. Therefore, firms issue combinations of debt and equity only if both securities are fairly priced not only collectively but also individually. Pooling equilibria involving cross-subsidization can exist only if the less valuable for the subsidizer security (debt) is issued (corner solution). In this case, there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects for the subsidizer. As a result, the subsidizer maximizes his return by minimizing the subsidy he provides the other type. 17 Notice that in the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 an entrepreneur owning a good project is worse off compared to the case where types are observable and his project is funded at fair terms. However, social welfare exceeds that under full information about types (see also the discussion in Subsection 5.2.2). 18 We conjecture that, under certain restrictions on the probability and cost functions, this pooling equilibrium exists even if the effort level is a continuous variable. 19 In a two-stage signalling game, such a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. Behaving myopically, the managers of good projects would try to reveal the type of their project by issuing more debt and less equity. However, the managers of bad projects would always mimic and, more importantly, their effort incentives would be destroyed. Therefore, there would exist either pooling equilibria where only debt is issued (corner solution) and the managers of good projects work whereas those of bad projects shirk or pooling equilibria where the managers of both types of projects shirk and so no funds are provided. In either case, the resulting pooling equilibria are Pareto-inferior to that of Proposition 4.
In contrast, in the presence of effort moral hazard, if the subsidizer cannot reveal his type, it may be in his interest to incur the adverse selection cost of issuing some of the more valuable for him security. By doing so, he provides the manager of the bad project with the subsidy necessary to induce him to work and so the collective expected return rises. If the resulting increase in his expected return exceeds this adverse selection cost, the subsidizer's welfare improves. For example, in Proposition 4 the benefit (due to the lower interest rate his firm pays on debt) for the entrepreneur with a good project from his firm issuing some equity and inducing the manager of a bad project to exert effort exceeds the underpricing of his equity (the adverse selection cost associated with the equity issue).
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In the pure moral hazard case, the financiers observe the type of each individual project. As a result, each type of project is offered contracts along the corresponding zero-profit line, provided it exists. In the context of our simple model, the mode of financing is irrelevant. 21 All combinations of debt and equity along the existing zeroprofit line are offered and are equally preferred by the corresponding type.
Implications for Investment and Social Welfare
Under the conditions in Proposition 4, if types were observable only good projects would receive financing. If the manager of a bad project receives funds at fair terms he shirks and so his project NPV is negative. Moreover, financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from good to bad projects to induce the managers of the latter to exert effort. Thus, no rational financier would be willing to provide the manager of a bad project with the funds required for the investment and so no bad project would be undertaken. That is, under full information about the inherent quality of projects a potentially positive NPV investment opportunity is forgone. Furthermore, because when the manager of a bad project works his project NPV exceeds the cost of effort, the social welfare also worsens.
These results are in sharp contrast with the pure adverse selection case. In Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection leads firms to forego positive NPV projects whereas in de Meza and Webb (1987) it encourages firms to undertake negative NPV projects. Hence, in either case social welfare is lower than under full information about types. The key to this difference is that in the presence of (effort) moral hazard the crosssubsidization taking place in a pooling equilibrium relaxes this additional constraint and so it can be beneficial. In contrast, given risk neutrality, under pure adverse selection there is no channel through which the cross-subsidy can have positive effects but it may have negative consequences.
Empirical Implications
This pooling equilibrium also has implications for empirical testing: i) From Eq. (7) it is clear that the higher the proportion of low-profitability firms (the lower λ ), the higher (lower) the fraction of funds raised through equity (debt). Intuitively, as the proportion of good projects falls, the fraction of equity needed to provide the managers of bad projects with the subsidy necessary to induce them to work increases. This prediction is consistent with the findings in Fama and French (2005) . ii) At date 1, all firms issue the same fraction of equity and debt with identical face value. However, at date 2, when the quality of projects becomes publicly known, because debt issued by both types of firm is equally valuable while the equity issued by good firms is more valuable, good firms have lower debt-equity ratios. This negative relation between leverage and profitability has been documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) ).
Optimal Financial Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
If the inherent quality of projects and the actions of managers were observable (and verifiable), the managers of both types of projects would exert effort if they were offered funds at fair terms. As a result, the net social surplus (social welfare) would be maximized (first best). However, if the choice of the effort level is not observable and th managers of bad projects shirk if they receive funds at fair terms, the implementation of the socially efficient outcome requires cross-subsidization across types. In this section, we address the following question: Can competitive financial markets implement the socially efficient outcome under the same conditions as a benevolent central authority (social planner) who aims at maximizing social welfare?
Competitive financiers have no incentive to transfer resources from good projects to bad ones to induce the managers of the latter to exert effort. Therefore, if the quality of projects is observable or can be credibly revealed, they offer funds only to good projects and so competitive markets cannot maximize social welfare. In a competitive environment, the implementation of the socially efficient outcome can be achieved only in a pooling equilibrium where the required cross-subsidization takes place through the mispricing of the more valuable security issued by the good projects (equity). We begin by characterizing the social planner's solution (the optimal contract) under adverse selection and effort moral hazard.
The Social Planner's Solution: The Optimal Contract
The social planner's objective is to induce the managers of both types of projects to exert effort whenever feasible. Hence, the social planner will offer the managers of bad projects the required subsidy even if he can distinguish the two types, provided the effort incentive constraint of managers of good projects is not violated. Since the returns of the two types of projects in case of success are different, observable and verifiable, the social planner can ex post distinguish them and promise to offer them funds at fair terms. Moreover, he can commit to making direct lump-sum transfers, τ , from good projects to bad ones so that the effort incentive constraint of the managers of bad projects and the social planner feasibility constraint are just binding, and the effort incentive constraint of the managers of good projects is not violated. Mathematically,
Solving (9) and (10) for B τ and G τ respectively and substituting into (11), we obtain:
Where SP λ is the minimum proportion of good projects consistent with the managers of both types of projects exerting effort. In fact, it is the only restriction on the parameter values the social planner faces in his attempt to implement the socially efficient outcome. That is, the optimal contract involves the resolution of the adverse selection problem and lump-sum transfers.
Implementing the Optimal Contract with Debt and Equity
Now that we have characterized the optimal contract, we examine its implementation as a competitive equilibrium using financial instruments observed in the real world. By Proposition 4, we know that, for any
there exists a pooling equilibrium where the managers of both types of projects exert effort and receive funds by issuing a debt-equity combination. That is, the only restriction on parameter values required for the existence of the socially efficient pooling equilibrium is that the social planner also faces. Therefore, a debt-equity combination can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium. This result relies on the fact that the socially efficient pooling equilibrium Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium even if both effort incentive constraints are just binding. In other words, the benefit for the owner of a good project from inducing the manager of a bad project to exert effort through the mispricing of equity more than offsets the incremental subsidy (relative to the all-debt equilibrium where the bad project manager shirks) even if the total subsidy is so high that the effort incentive constraint of the good project manager is just binding. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider project financing under adverse selection and (effort) moral hazard. Several interesting results are obtained. First, we showed that capital structure matters even though managerial contracts are optimally designed. Second, we provided an explanation of why good firms issue underpriced equity even though the bankruptcy and other agency costs associated with debt are zero. This mispricing provides the managers of bad firms with the subsidy necessary to induce them to exert effort. The resulting increase in the aggregate expected return leads to a fall in the interest rate on debt (gain) which is greater than the underpricing of equity. That is, good firms accept to incur the adverse selection cost of issuing equity because this cost is more than offset by the benefit from relaxing the moral hazard constraint. Third, we showed that, in the presence of moral hazard, this mispricing may result in the conversion of a negative into a positive NPV project and an improvement in the aggregate expected returns and social welfare.
Finally, our results have also some implications for empirical testing: i) The higher the proportion of low-profitability (bad) firms, the higher the fraction of funds raised through equity. This prediction is consistent with the findings in Fama and French (2005) . ii) In our pooling equilibrium all firms issue the same fraction of equity and debt with identical face value. However, because debt issued by both types of firm is equally valuable while the equity issued by good firms is more valuable, when the quality of projects becomes publicly known good firms have lower debt-equity ratios. This negative relation between leverage and profitability has been documented by several empirical studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) 
Separate Debt and Equity Markets
The analysis in the text assumed that the required amount of funds I is provided by the same financier who purchases both debt and equity. In this appendix, we show that all the results go through even if the buyer of debt and the buyer of equity are different (debt and equity markets are separate). It suffices to show that the zero-profit lines of an equitybuyer, a debt-buyer and a financier purchasing both debt and equity coincide. The following assumptions are made:
i) The project is indivisible. ii) Firms cannot lend and the consumption good is perishable. iii) Debt and equity markets are perfectly competitive.
The first assumption implies that firms borrow at least I. The second implies that no firm will borrow more than I. Therefore, they borrow just I. Given these three assumptions, we have:
[ ] 
That is, the zero-profit lines of an equity-financier, a debt-financier and a financier purchasing both debt and equity coincide. Therefore, the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4 obtains regardless of whether the same investor purchases both debt and equity and provides the required amount I or the debt-financier and the equity-financier are different (bond and equity markets are separate).
